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Hagerv. Declamation District, III U. S., 7o) that the Act of California of
March 23, I876, entitled " An Act to authorize the widening of Dupont Street
in the City of San Francisco," provides for a due process of law for taking
the property necessary for that purpose, the Court says, "Errors in the mere
administration of the statute not involving jurisdiction of the subject and of
the parties, could not justify this Court, in its re-examination of the judgment
of the State Court, upon a writ of error, to hold that the State had deprived or
was about to deprive the plaintiffs of their property without due process of
law." Per Mr. Justice HARLAN, p. 331.

RECENT DECISIONS.
On the 23 d of April, i87o.
TRUSTS VOID AGAINST CREDITORS.
One W. M. Thomas signed and delivered to S. Thomas, Jr., a paper in
the following words, "I hereby assign to Mr. Thomas, Jr., a note of S7,ooo,
dated .....
.1863,
made by Mrs. Mary Raymond to me, payable six months
after paece, or sooner, at my option. This is to secure Peter Thomas in a note
made by him to the state of South Carolina, upon which I was security, and
the proceeds of which, to wit, property at the State Works in Greenville,
South Carolina, was taken by me for the debts of Barksdale, Perry & Co.,
and which note is now out and unpaid." He had previously declared in an
instrument in writing that he held certain other notes in trust for his wife and
free from his martial rights, and lie further declared that he reserved to himself
the power to collect and invest the same or dispose of it as may be proper for
her benefit, as her Trustee, and again, "I hereby relinquish all claim to the
same on my individual account." On the back of the deed of trust was this
indorsement, "Having used some of the papers, I put in their place the following note of Mrs. Mary Raymond upon which a decree has been made in
the Court of Equity for Greenvile District, claim on estate of J. M. Turpin in
Commissioner's office and on Pickett's estate in same office. This note he
subsequently assigned as collateral as above and used in other ways as his
own individual property. It further appeared that the alleged trust was secret.
Held that the trust so attempted to be created was null and void as against
the creditors of W. M. Thomas, who were entitled to tile proceeds of the
note.
tlytlhe
v. Tionzzas, District Court, C. South Carolina, April ii, i891, per
SIMONTON, J.
TRADE-MARK.
Cream Baking Powder.
A motion was made for a preliminary injunction to restrain the use of the
word "Cream" in connection with the words "Baking Powder." It appeared
"
that the plaintiff used the word "Cream 1 in c6mbination with the words
"Price's Baking Powder" and the defendant, using wrappers similar in design
used the word "Cream" in combination with the words "National Baking
Powder." Judge NELSON, in granting the preliminary injunction, said, "The
complainant is certainly entitled to protection in the use of this word in connection with the Baking Powder it manufactures, unless it is adopted and used
as description of the article, its ingredients or characteristics etc. The Baking Powder is neither composed nor does that word convey the idea that it is
the "Best" or choicest, as asserted by defendant."
PriceBaking-Powder Co. v. Ffe, Circuit Court D, Minnesota, Third
Division. April, i89I.
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TAx. DEEDS.
Formalities of the law must be strictly observed.
The charter of Kansas City prescribes that a tax deed shall recite that the
sale was publically held on the first day on whichsaid real propertywas advertised for sale. The Court held that a tax deed was void which omitted the
words "publically" in the clause "at the sale began and publically held,"
and in a suit by the purchaser of the tax deed evidence is not admissible to
show that the sales were in fact publically held. This case Sullivan v..Donnell,
9o Mo. 278; Daniels v. Case, Circuit Court, W. D. Missouri, April 4, i891.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.
Transportation through an Indian country.
Twenty-nine gallons of whiskey, and other articles, were seized by George
Steel, an Indian(Agent upon the Blackfoot Indian Reservation, as articles not
permitted by law on such reservations, and forfeited to the United States. It
appears that the defendants were transporting the spirits as articles of commerce through the Indian country between places outside the same. Held
that they had not violated Rev. St. U. S. C. 2139 which provides that "no
ardent spirits shall be introduced, under any pretense, into the Indian country." Judge KNOWELS said: "In construing the statute under consideration, we should look at the objects of the same and the evil sought to be remedied thereby. The purpose of the statute was undoubtedly to prevent the
placing of whiskey, or ardent or spirituous Jiquors, in such place as would
make it accessible to Indians. It is not the purpose of that statute to interfere
in any manner with the commerce in spirituous liquors between sections of the
country not Indian. The construction of that statute, which would allow the
seizing of spiritous liquors found upon an Indian reservation, without reference to the purposes !n regard to which it came there, would prevent the transportation of liquors from the East to the Pacific Coast on the line of the Northern Pacific Railway.. . . For these reasons I hold the proper construction of'
above statute, as to the terms " no ardent spirits shall be introduced, under any
pretence, in the Indian country," is as follows: Whenever such liquors are taken
into an Indian country, as their place of destination, or use, then they have
been introduced into such country. In other words, when such liquors reach
an Indian country, as the end of their journey, they have within the meaning
of that statute, been introduced into such a country. It is not necessary to
show that they were brought there for the purpose of sale to the Indians or
anyone.
The transportation of such liquors through an Indian country,
between places outside the same, as an article of commerce, is not, within the
meaning of this statute, introducing them into said countryUnitedStates v. 7wenty-nine Gallons of Wh7tiskey, District Court, D. Montana, April 20, 1891.
APPLICATION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION-WHEN DENIED.
The application was made "pendente lite." The complainant was insolvent. The defendants were extensively engaged in the business of lighting
the streets and other public and private places in New Orleans. The complainant asked the Court to restrain the use of the lamps on account of infringement of patent. Tile Court held that "where a preliminary injunction,
"pendente lite," would greatly inconvenience the public and seriously injure
defendent, without materially benefiting complainant, it should not be granted.
Southwestern Brush Electric Light and PowerCompfany v. LouisianaElectric
Light Company. Circuit Court, E. D. Louisiana. Decided April 18, iSgi.
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CONTRACT RELATING TO MORTGAGE-RESPONSIBILITY OF PURCIHASER FROM
MORTGAGOR TO SEE TO THE APPLICATION OF PURCHASE MONEY.

A contract by a mortgagee, made on receiving the mortgage, that he will
hold the security, and that the Mortgagor may sell the property named in said
deeds and make titles thereto, the proceeds of the sale to go the credit of the
Mortgagee, gives to the Mortgagor power to sell for cash, free from the mortgage, but not to exchange for other lands. It does not cast upon the purchaser for cash the duty of seeing that the mortgagor appropriates the proceeds according to agreement. lVoodward v. Jewell, Supreme Court of the
United States. Decided May ii, 1891.
RAILROAD MORTGAGE-STOCK IN AND ELEVATORS NOT COVERED BY

IORT-

GAGE AS APPURTENCES.

Several railroad companies, having combined to build an elevator, each
contracted to provide an equal sum towards its cost, each to receive certificates of stock in a corporation organized to take title to the elevator and to
construct it. Held that each company was a stockholder in the company which
constructed it, and that no company had an interest ill the property itself
which it could mortgage, and that therefore such stock would not pass to a
mortgagee of one of the railroads under a general description as an appurturnance to the road. Hiohrnlireysv. jlfeAXissoil, Supreme Court of the United
States.

Decided May ii, 1891.

COMrMITTAL FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT NO DEPRIVATION OF THE RIGHT TO
TRIAL BY JURY.

One John l. Clayton was committed to jail under x. Sess. Laws of Conn.,

1889, c. 167, which provides that if a person be found guilty of being drunk
and refuses on request of prosecuting officer to disclose under oath when,
-where, and from whom he procured the liquor, the magistrate before whom
the trial was had shall commit the offender to the county jail for contempt. In
an application for a writ of Habeas Corp5us, the Court held that this is not
deprivinghim of the right to trial by jury, as provided by the 21st section of
Article i, of the Constitution of Connecticut. The Court, per CARPENTER, J.,
said: "This objection (that it was a deprivation of the right of trial by jury)
misconstrues the nature and character of the proceedings before the Police
Court. The appellant was not then before the Court as a defendant in a
criminal prosecution. That had been his position; but upon his conviction
that was changed, and he become, so far as this case is concerned, merely a
witness. He was in no sense on trial-no one was-and therefore was not in
jeopardy. The proceeding was not judicial but ministerial."
In re Claylon, Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, December IS.
z89o.
EMINENT DOMAIN-PROPERTY SUBJECT-.NIARKET COMPANIES.

A company authorized by the act incorporating it to acquire such real or
personal estate as it may deem necessary for the maintenance of a markethouse, with full power to sell and convey at pleasure, and whose purpose, as
directed in said act, is to erect and maintain a building as a public markethouse, the same to be leased, rented or disposed of on such terms as tile
managers should determine, is a mere private corporation, having no such
relation to the State or to the public as will, in the absence of a clear and ex-
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press authority necessarily implied from the grant, exempt its property from
the exercise of eminent domain.
(Syllabus from Atlantic Report.)
Twelfik St. ifarket Co. v. Phila R. &
T. R. Co., Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, May 2, x891.
INJURIES TO PASSENGERS-RIDING ON BAGGAGE CAR-AssuMPTION OF RIsK.
A passenger boarding a railroad train entered the smoking car, he being in
the act ofsmoking at the time. The smoking car was the rear car ofthe train, and
the rear compartment of it was arranged for the carriage of baggage. He found
every seat in the smoking compartment occupied, and passed into the baggage
compartment. There was a rule of the railroad company requiring those in
charge not to permit passengers to ride in baggage-cars. But ofthis rule the passenger had no knowledge. He and other passengers had frequently before
been permitted to ride therein without objection and the conductor had accepted
and punched their tickets while in that compartment, as he did on the occasion
in question. By the company's negligence [a train, proceeding in the same
direction on the same track, ran into the rear of the train on which the passenger rode, and he was thereby injured. Held that by taking his position in
the baggage compartment, under the circumstances, the passenger took the
risk of any injury from dangers inherent in the construction or use thereof for
the purpose of carrying baggage, but that his conduct, even if it be considered
as contributing to an injury received from extraneous causes, such as a collision, could not be deemed to have been negligent, and that a charge to that
effect was not erroneous.
NAe-w York, L. E. & IV. R. Co. v. Ball. (Supreme Court of New Jersey,
June i, i8qz.)
LIABILITY OF MARRIED WOMEN.

The language of the Act of Revision, 637 'of New Jersey, is as follows:
"4ny married woman shall have the right to bind herself by contract in the
manner and to the same extent as though she were unmarried, and which contracts shall be legal and obligatory, and may be enforced at law or in equity,
by or against such married woman in her own name apart from her husband;
provided, that nothing herein shall enable such married woman to become an
accommodation endorser, guarantor, or surety, nor shall she be liable, on
any promise to pay the debt or answer for default or liability, 'of any other
person."
Held that when a married woman is sued upon a joint and several obligation, which does not show on its face that she occupied the position of surety,
the burden is upon her to set up and prove the defense of suretyship on her
part.
Reeves v. M[organ, Court of Chancery of New Jersey. Decided May 28,
1891.
KNOWLEDGE OF ATTORNEY OF CRIMINAL INTENT OF CLIENT.
If the communication or conference between client and counsel is to devise
means by which a crime is to be committed, in which the attorney takes an
active part, there is no privilege; he ceases to be counsel and becomes fiarlireis crimiinis. If he takes no part, there is no professional privilege, because
it cannot be a solicitor's business to advise in furtherance of a criminal object.
The contriving of a fraud is no part of the professional occupation of an
attorney or solicitor. In order that the rule of professional privilege may
apply, there must be both professional employment and professional confi°
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dence. If the client has a criminal or fraudulent object in view in his communition with his counsel, one of those elements must necessarily be absent. If
the object is avowed, the client does not consult his adviser professionally; if
it is not disclosed, he reposes no confidence.
In a civil suit, the first test as to whether the communication involved a
purpose which was or was not tainted with fraud is the issue as made by the
pleadings in the cause.
fatlthews v foagland et al. (Court of Chancery of New Jersey, May 25,
1891.)
LEGAL MISCELLANY.
A CASE WHERE IGNORANCE WAS BLISS.

A bill for a certain injunction had been pending in Chancery for some time,
during which it had been several times argued in various phases, so that the
Chancellor was quite familiar with the respective claims of the contesting
parties, and the grounds upon which they were based. Before the trial hearing was had, a motion was made for the admission orladditional testimony, and
one day this was argued. Having heard much the same argument several
times before, the Chancellor evidently did not pay very close attention to what
counsel were saying, for when they had finished he announced his decision,
refusing an injunction and dismissing the bill. When the Court had finished,
and counsel for complainant had sufficiently recovered from the shock, they
returned to point out that the only question they had intended to submit was
the admission of further testimony. "Indeed," said the Chancellor, visibly
annoyed at the prospect of having to take up the case again, " well then, gentlemen, you have the advantage of knowing my views on-the subject."
STEWART z,. BARRINGER.

It is not often that lawyers give vent to their sense of humor when drawing up a statement of their client's case, but that they sometimes do is evident
from the case of Stewart v. Barringe-, reported in 38 Pittsburgh Legal Journal, 235, which was an action to recover damages for the trespass of swine.
The plaintiff having secured a verdict, an appeal was taken to the Supreme
Court, and Chief Justice PAxSON, in delivering the opinion, said: "According
to the statement of the plaintiff the defendant kept a very voracious set of
hogs. They were a slab-sided, long-snooted breed, against whose daily and
nocturnal visits there is no barrier. They were of an exceedingly rapacons
nature, and six of them, at one sitting, devoured fifty pounds of paints, thirty
gallons of soft soap, four bushels of apples and five bushels of potatoes, the
property of the plaintiff. They raided the plaintiff's dpring-house, upset his
milk crocks, and wallowed in his spring, and for several years foraged upon
his corn, potato, rye and oats crops, and resorted to his garden, orchard and
meadow. They obtained an entrance by rooting out his fence chunks, and
going under, or by throwing down the fence, or by working the combination
on the gate."
These hogs were greedy, and the plaintiff notified the defendant several
times to shut them up, and the last time told him if he did not shut them up
he would, and the defendant replied, "Shut them up and be d-d."
"It may be this statement is exaggerated," says the Chief Justice, "yet
the jury have found that they were troublesome hogs," etc. And the verdict
was sustained.

